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Book Reviews
The Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism. 
By Ami Pedahzur. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
ISBN: 978-0-231-14043-0. Notes. Glossary. Index. Illustrations. 
Pp. 232. $22.50.
Having read quite a few books on security and terrorism, topics that fasci-
nated me during my civil service career with the Government of Israel, I 
was looking with interest for an Israeli author with an impressive security 
background that would for once provide balanced criticism of the Israeli 
counterterrorism struggle.
I believe that Mr. Pedahzur has done justice to this topic in his book, The 
Israeli Secret Services & The Struggle Against Terrorism, despite the fact 
that his service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was much like mine: he 
was a medic. Mr. Pedahzur is not an acclaimed, retired warrior from Mos-
sad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, one of three 
main Israeli entities tasked mostly with activities outside of Israel), or 
Shabak (an acronym for the General Security Service, known also as Shin 
Bet, which specializes in intelligence gathering within Israel and the occu-
pied territories, but occasionally operates in Israel's neighboring coun-
tries). And yet his book is well written and superbly researched, and reads 
almost like a thriller. In my own career, I served in the Israel National 
Police (INP) and in various assignments that allowed me more than a 
fleeting peek into the Israeli Intelligence Community (IC). I was pleas-
antly surprised to find this book finally tells the truth about a painful and 
problematic topic: Israel's struggle with terrorism.
Pedahzur has not just written another book about Israel and its six 
decades of being plagued (mostly) by Palestinian terrorism. He takes the 
reader through the country's history since the end of World War I, a war 
in which Jews aided the Allies by spying on forces of the Turkish Ottoman 
Empire. Israel gained its independence in 1948, and since then its history 
has been marked by a struggle with terrorism. Pedahzur attempts to 
observe this effort mostly from the war model, which also reflects the 
counterterrorism policies of the United States and other countries. The 
"war model," or "War on Terror," deals with policies that increasingly 
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have undermined civil liberties and human rights, and at the same time 
evaded or ignored the underlying causes of terrorism, thus increasing the 
terrorist threat. This model deals mostly with the involvement of various 
IDF Special Forces units, and how they were deployed against what essen-
tially is seen as revolutionary, or guerrilla, warfare. Pedahzur, however, is 
careful to omit almost no one who takes part in the counterterrorism 
struggle, and when applicable observes it from two other perspectives: 
judiciary, which deals with terrorism as a criminal act, and reconciliatory, 
which handles it through politics and diplomacy.
Israeli politicians and leaders are quite often prominent figures who have 
retired from the IDF or IC; thus, there is little wonder that for over sixty 
years the country has dealt with terrorism using the war model. One of 
Pedahzur's observations is that Israel's reputation as one of the best, most 
experienced terrorism opponents may not entirely be deserved. In an 
undated interview, he posed the question of why terrorism against Israelis 
has intensified and become more deadly over the years if Israel is indeed 
such a counterterrorism superpower. Pedahzur proposes that time and 
again the policymakers erred by using various military commando units, 
barely trained in counterterrorism warfare, instead of a superbly trained 
police counterterrorism commando group such as the Special Police Unit 
Yehidat Mishtara Meyiuhedet (or Yamam, by which I was trained in sev-
eral counternarcotics operations). Until recently, Yamam was always sec-
ond to one of the IDF surveillance commando units (Sayarot). Pedahzur 
covers the everyday tasks of the units belonging to the Army Military 
Intelligence (Sayeret Matkal), and a variety of other special military 
units, including Mossad. He explains each unit's routine duties, as well as 
its performance in counterterrorism operations. Through detailed 
descriptions of specific hijackings, kidnappings, and hostage situations, 
Pedahzur illustrates the success or failure of the unit(s) that took part in 
the operation, and describes the action's place in Israeli history.
I feel obligated to say that even sage Israelis frequently harbor incorrect 
conceptions of the participation and performance of these units in coun-
terterrorism situations. Moreover, they are often wrong about which unit 
was involved in a certain operation. For example, after the Ma'alot hos-
tage crisis on May 15, 1974, it was widely published that Sayeret Golani 
conducted the assault, when in reality, as Pedahzur notes, Sayeret Matkal 
carried it out. Another example of erroneous information involved the 
1976 hostage rescue effort at Entebbe, during which Yoni Netanyahu, 
commander of the ground assault troops, was shot in the throat and died 
almost instantly. The media glorified his death, claiming he was shot in 
the chest and died over an hour later while being aided by a doctor and 
surrounded by his warriors. It is widely accepted that the Israeli media 
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are truthful but naturally somewhat biased, so sometimes might not dis-
close all the known facts and thus leave room for speculation. Dover Tza-
hal, official IDF spokesman, carefully avoids outright lies, but at times 
issues only partially true statements. He and the civil media seem to have 
tacitly agreed to delay or suppress certain national security-related facts. 
Only a minimal number of state security-related news articles are sup-
pressed, but Dover Tzahal's announcements have the highest credibility 
and exert the strongest influence on public opinion. After any successful 
or failed counterterrorism operation, it is usually Tzahal who breaks the 
news.
Pedahzur concludes that the long-term aim of destroying Palestinian ter-
rorism was not only unsuccessful, but led to intensified terrorist attacks. 
He also states that Israel has been only partially successful in deterring 
enemy attacks. The author claims "the psychological effect (of Israeli 
combat expertise) on Palestinian and Lebanese fighters was of no great 
consequence. Not only were they not deterred from continuing to strike at 
Israel, but their efforts also intensified over the years..." (p. 6). Other 
counterterrorism experts have asserted that Israel's military and political 
bureaucracies have been far too slow in adapting to changes within terror-
ist organizations, and thus have coped poorly with splinter cells and small 
terrorist groups—even with larger entities such as Hizbollah and Hamas. 
As a result, relatively small terrorist organizations with limited funding 
can terrorize Israel, especially with weapons of mass destruction. In addi-
tion, the country has been slow to develop technology and urban warfare 
tactics for combating terrorists, despite the fact that its military industry 
is one of the most fertile in the world.
I would like to briefly compare the results of Israel's counterterrorism 
efforts and those of the United States in Afghanistan following 9/11. As 
stated earlier, over the six decades of its existence Israel has fought terror-
ism with limited results. It has suppressed terrorism periodically, but 
never conclusively. Similarly, the United States—after ten long years of 
battling the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of 
the world with a large modern army, including special units and innova-
tive technology—has failed to liquidate Afghan terrorism. Most analysts 
claim that al-Qaida has been dramatically weakened and splintered. Yet 
today it affiliates itself with other Salafi terrorist groups that have taken 
part in an unknown number of post-9/11 attacks, such as the 2004 rail-
road bombing in Spain, the 2005 subway bombing in the UK, and the 
foiled 2006 plan to simultaneously blow up ten aircraft on their way to 
the United States. Hundreds of thousands of Salafi and Shia Muslims 
worldwide fund and support Middle Eastern, East African, and Asian ter-
rorist groups, as well as international al-Qaida and other Salafist groups. 
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The notion of defeating America, as well as annihilating Israel and all 
Jews, is almost invariably sounded.
Israeli and American efforts to liquidate terrorism have thus far failed. 
Pedahzur correctly sees terrorism as a psychological tactic aimed at the 
public, which in turn influences leaders and decision makers through 
electoral pressure. A fast and devastating response to a terrorist attack 
serves to reassure the public, possibly moderately boosting morale. 
Besides being a temporary "Band-Aid," however, such responses truly 
benefit only the political leaders (p. 8).
The public's influence does not stop with politicians. It trickles down to 
the intelligence community and military and plays an important role in 
funding and disbursement. Pedahzur explains this well in relation to 
Israel's IC and military units deployed in counterterrorism efforts. The 
issue is better understood in terms of the constant turf fighting among 
elements of the Israeli counterterrorism community. The special ops units 
of the IDF and IC are secrecy-oriented. Most of their operations are so 
secret, in fact, that the units almost never receive overt credit for their 
success. Counterterrorism is a field in which participation and success hit 
the media very quickly, and thus the unit gets its credit much in the fash-
ion of the U.S. Navy Seals following the liquidation of Usama bin Ladin. 
Hence, the military units compete with one another. This competition is 
also prevalent among Shabak, the Military Intelligence Directorate 
(Aman), Mossad, and, to a much lesser extent, the police, whose role was 
not mentioned in this book despite the fact that police investigators rou-
tinely participated in the arrests and interrogation of terror suspects at 
least until 1991 (when I left the INP). The immediate outcome of this com-
petition among intelligence units and organizations is the familiar unwill-
ingness to share knowledge and cooperate.
Pedahzur is correct in stating that this unfortunate feature of the Israeli 
IC can have a devastating influence on the struggle against terrorism. 
Even though certain lessons of 9/11 have been learned and changes made 
in the American IC, cooperation and information sharing have been lim-
ited. This "malaise" among security services is common in most democra-
cies, and unlikely to be completely resolved. Although this unhealthy 
competition may distract security organizations from their original tasks 
involving state security and undermine national strategic interests, some 
may view such competition as a sign of healthy agility. I do not.
Yehuda J. Lev, Lieutenant Colonel, Israel National Police (Retired)
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